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Without large increases in the number of health workers to treat HIV/AIDS (HAHW), most developing
countries will be unable to achieve universal coverage with antiretroviral treatment (ART), leading
to large numbers of potentially avoidable deaths among people living with HIV/AIDS.  We use Markov
Monte Carlo microsimulation to estimate the expected net present value (eNPV) of a scholarship for
health care education that is conditional on the recipient entering into a contract to work for a number
of years after graduation delivering ART in sub-Saharan Africa.  Such a scholarship could increase
the number of health workers educated in the region and decrease the probability of HAHW emigration.
"Conditional scholarships" for a team of health workers sufficient to provide ART for 500 patients
have an eNPV of 1.23 million year-2000 US dollars, assuming that the scholarship recipients are in
addition to the health workers who would have been educated without scholarships and that the scholarships
reduce annual HAHW emigration probabilities from 15% to 5% for five years.  When individual variable
values are varied from this base case within plausible bounds suggested by the literature, eNPV of
the "conditional scholarships" never falls below 0.5 million year-2000 US dollars.
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Introduction 
Global epidemiology of HIV and HIV/AIDS health worker need 
According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and 
the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2006 about 40 million people worldwide 
were HIV-positive, 37 million of whom lived in developing countries 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2006).  Sub-Saharan Africa bears the brunt of the HIV epidemic 
with 25 million HIV-positive people as of 2006, followed by South-East Asia with 
7.8 million HIV-positive people.  The number of people living with HIV continues 
to grow.  From 2004 to 2006 the global total increased by 2.6 million 
(UNAIDS/WHO, 2006), despite substantial mortality from HIV/AIDS.  In sub-
Saharan Africa alone, 2.1 million people died of AIDS in 2006 (UNAIDS/WHO, 
2006).   
 
The number of people in developing countries who receive antiretroviral 
treatment (ART) has grown rapidly in the last three years – in sub-Saharan 
Africa, from less than 300,000 by the end of 2004 to more than 800,000 by the 
end of 2005 (WHO/UNAIDS, 2006b) and to more than 1 million by the end of 
2006 (UNAIDS/WHO, 2006).  Yet current ART coverage falls far short of need.  
In 2006, an estimated 4.6 million people in sub-Saharan Africa needed ART, 
more than four times the number of people on treatment (WHO/UNAIDS, 2006a).  
According to WHO/UNAIDS, in 2006 only 8 out of 92 developing countries for 
which data on ART coverage were available achieved coverage of 80% or higher 
(Figure 1) (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).     4 
 
< Figure 1 about here > 
 
The unmet need for ART means the loss of many lives that could have been 
saved.  It is well known that ART is effective in reducing HIV-related mortality 
(Hogg, Yip, Kully, Craib, O'Shaughnessy, Schechter et al., 1999).  Recent 
evidence from Botswana (The Global Fund, 2007) and South Africa (Herbst, 
Cooke, Bärnighausen, KanyKany, & Newell, 2007) suggests that, even while a 
large proportion of people who currently need ART are not yet receiving 
treatment, the reduction in mortality among those who do receive ART has led to 
an overall decline in mortality among people living with HIV.   
 
One of the main constraints in scaling up ART is human resources (Clark, 2006; 
Habte, Dussault, & Dovlo, 2004; Hosseinipour, Kazembe, Sanne, & van der 
Horst, 2002; Kober & Van Damme, 2004; Ooms, Van Damme, & Temmerman, 
2007).  A number of recent reports and international initiatives, such as the 
Commission for Africa (Commission for Africa, 2005; MSF, 2007a), the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM)’s 2007 evaluation of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) (IOM, 2007), the 2004 report on human resources by the Joint 
Learning Initiative (JLI) (JLI, 2004b), the 2006 World Health Report (WHO, 2006) 
and a 2007 report by Médecins sans frontièrs (MSF) (MSF, 2007a) have 
identified the shortage of health workers in developing countries as one of the 
main impediments to human development in general and access to ART   5 
specifically.  The report of the Commission for Africa estimates that Africa’s 
health workforce needs to be tripled over the coming decade in order to achieve 
human development goals (Commission for Africa, 2005).  The 2007 IOM report 
states that “[s]evere human resource shortages are a continuing challenge to 
PEPFAR implementation” and proposes a shift in PEPFAR’s involvement in 
national human resources strategies (IOM, 2007; The Lancet, 2007).  IOM 
recommends that PEPFAR should not limit its activities to the provision of AIDS 
care-specific training to existing health workers and the promotion of task shifting 
between different types of health workers, but should actively work to increase 
national health workforces. 
 
There are two main reasons for the shortage of health workers to treat HIV/AIDS 
(HAHW) in the developing world (JLI, 2004b; MSF, 2007a; USAID Bureau for 
Africa, 2003; WHO, 2006).  First, education rates in many developing countries 
are too low to produce the number of health workers needed to deliver ART.  In 
2006, only 66 of the worldwide 1,691 medical schools and only 288 of the 
worldwide 5,492 nursing and midwifery schools were located in Africa (WHO, 
2006).  The United Republic of Tanzania is a case in point.  In 2002, about 740 
doctors were available to care for Tanzania’s population of about 37 million 
people.  We estimate that Tanzania would need between 229 and 458 additional 
doctors to be able to provide universal ART coverage (see Table 1a in the 
appendix).  However, each year only about 90 doctors graduate from a medical 
school in Tanzania (JLI, 2004b).       6 
 
Second, of the small numbers of health workers educated in developing 
countries, especially in Africa, large proportions tend to emigrate.  It has been 
estimated that 20,000 health workers migrate each year from Africa to developed 
countries (WHO, 2004).  According to the 2005 Report of the Global Commission 
on International Migration (GCIM), 16,000 African nurses migrated to the UK 
alone between 2000 and 2005 (GCIM, 2005).  A 2002 WHO survey of health 
workers in six sub-Saharan countries found that between 38% and 68% intended 
to emigrate (WHO, 2003).   
 
Countries where the need to expand ART is high commonly have low numbers of 
health workers per capita.  Figure 2 shows scatter plots of national HIV 
prevalence (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007; World Bank, 2007) against health worker 
densities (WHO, 2007c).  Countries with higher HIV prevalence tend to have 
lower physician, nurse, and pharmacist densities than countries with lower 
prevalence (Figure 2, panels 1-3).    
 
< Figure 2 about here > 
 
The low health worker densities indicate that many developing countries must 
considerably increase their health workforce in order to be able provide ART to 
all people who currently need it.  Table 1a in the appendix shows estimates of 
the numbers of additional doctors, nurses, and pharmacists that would have   7 
been needed in 88 developing countries to provide universal coverage with ART 
in December 2006 (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).
1  These estimates assume that all 
added health workers would spend all of their work time providing ART – i.e. 
these estimates are the lower bounds of actual need.  In our calculations, we use 
numbers of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists needed to provide ART per 1,000 
patients from a recent review of ART programs in developing countries 
(Hirschhorn, Oguda, Fullem, Dreesch, & Wilson, 2006).  We find that in order to 
treat the approximately 3.6 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who in 
December 2006 needed ART, but did not receive it, the stock of health workers 
in sub-Saharan Africa would have had to be increased by 3,600 to 7,200 doctors, 
7,200 to 25,200 nurses, and 3,600 to 10,800 pharmacists.   
 
The number of future health workers needed to achieve universal ART coverage 
depends on the development of the epidemic.  Projections of the number of 
people living with HIV diverge considerably because both HIV incidence and 
mortality among HIV-positive people are determined by factors whose 
development over time is highly uncertain (Grassly, Morgan, Walker, Garnett, 
Stanecki, Stover et al., 2004; Mathers & Loncar, 2006).  On the one hand, HIV 
incidence is a function of sexual behavior, which can change significantly over 
the course of a few years, e.g. as observed in Uganda (Hallett, Aberle-Grasse, 
Bello, Boulos, Cayemittes, Cheluget et al., 2006) and Thailand (Saengdidtha, 
                                       
1 The 88 developing countries are all developing countries for which data on ART need and ART 
coverage are available from UNAIDS/WHO (2007) (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).   8 
Lapparat, Torugsa, Suppadit, & Wakai, 2002) following successful national 
campaigns to reduce the spread of HIV.  On the other hand, mortality among 
HIV-positive people depends inter alia on the speed of expansion of access to 
ART, people’s ability to adhere to ART over their lifetimes, and technical 
advances that increase the effectiveness of ART.  Moreover, general human and 
economic development is likely to influence both the spread of HIV and HIV-
related mortality (Broughton, 1999). 
 
In a UNAIDS scenario analysis for Africa, estimates of the total number of new 
HIV infections in adults and children that will occur between 2003 and 2025 
range from 46 million in the best-case scenario to 89 million in the worst-case 
scenario, while estimates of total deaths from AIDS between 1980 and 2025 
range from 67 to 83 million (UNAIDS, 2005).  Another study suggests that HIV 
prevalence (and thus in the long run treatment need) may either significantly 
increase or decline in sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2020, depending on the 
success of future HIV prevention and treatment efforts (Salomon, Hogan, Stover, 
Stanecki, Walker, Ghys et al., 2005).  However, the study finds that even in the 
best-case scenario, the number of people in need of ART in sub-Saharan Africa 
would decline only slightly by 2020 in comparison to 2006 (to 4.2 million), while it 
would double if the worst-case scenario came true (to 9.2 million) (Salomon et 
al., 2005).  In the latter case, universal ART coverage could only be achieved if 
sub-Saharan countries were able to increase their human resources for health   9 
over 2006 numbers by 8,200 to 16,400 doctors, 16,400 to 57,400 nurses, and 
8,200 to 24,600 pharmacists.   
 
“Conditional scholarships” 
Table 2a in the appendix provides an overview of interventions that have been 
implemented or proposed to address health worker shortages in developing 
countries.  We focus here on one particular intervention: scholarships for health 
care education given to qualified candidates conditional on their entering into a 
contract to work for a number of years after graduation delivering ART in a sub-
Saharan African country.  Such “conditional scholarships” could have two effects 
on national health workforces in the region.  First, the “scholarship” could 
increase the number of health workers educated in the country by enabling the 
health care education of secondary school graduates who would otherwise not 
have the means to finance such an education.  Second, the “condition” could 
increase the retention of recently graduated health workers in the country.  As 
such, the “conditional scholarships” could address the two main factors 
contributing to a shortage of health workers in many developing countries: a low 
rate of health worker education and a high rate of health worker emigration (JLI, 
2004b). 
 
For “conditional scholarships” to work at least one of the following two 
assumptions must be true.  First, there are qualified candidates in developing 
countries who desire a health care education but cannot obtain financing for such   10 
studies because of market imperfections in the supply of loans for education 
(Barr, 2004).  There is evidence that secondary school graduates in developing 
countries do indeed forego a health care education because of financial 
constraints (Colborn, 1991, 1992; Frey & Frey, 1995; IRIN Humanitarian News 
and Analysis, 2006).  Candidates may lack the financial means to pay for 
different components of a health care education: tuition and fees, living expenses 
while attending school, or the cost of required learning materials, such as books 
or medical equipment.  Second, there are qualified candidates in developing 
countries who desire a health care education and do have access to sources of 
finance for such an education (e.g. loans from the extended family or access to 
bank loans) but find the “conditional scholarship” the most attractive amongst all 
available funding options.  For instance, students may prefer a “conditional 
scholarship” to a bank loan.  Unlike “conditional scholarships”, which students 
receive in exchange for a commitment to work in a national ART program, bank 
loans carry the risk of bankruptcy because the borrower may not be able to meet 
future interest or redemption payments. 
 
In the following we will first investigate whether the “conditional scholarships” 
would be socially worthwhile investments by estimating their expected social net 
present value (eNPV).  In order to understand the specific contribution of each of 
the two possible effects of the “conditional scholarships” on scholarship eNPV, 
we will separately examine three types of scenarios: first, the only effect of the 
scholarships is to increase HAHW education rates; second, the scholarships   11 
increase HAHW education rates and decrease HAHW emigration rates; third, the 
only effect of the scholarships is to decrease HAHW emigration rates.  We will 
then discuss choices countries would need to make if they decided to implement 
“conditional scholarships”.  These include the source of finance, selection of 
candidates, specification of the condition, enforcement mechanisms, and 




In order to calculate eNPV of the “conditional scholarships”, we use a Markov 
Monte Carlo microsimulation.
2  Markov models are well suited for the question at 
hand because they allow different states of HAHW effectiveness with different 
costs and benefits at different times, and can easily incorporate discounting to 
calculate present values of future states.  Markov models capture uncertainty as 
transition probabilities between different states (Hunink, Glasziou, Siegel, Weeks, 
Pliskin, Elstein et al., 2001).  Microsimulation as one method to evaluate a 
Markov model has the advantage over the alternative cohort simulation that it 
yields an approximate distribution of NPV in addition to its expected value, eNPV, 
                                       
2 Markov models divide a target population (here: of health worker teams) into a series of 
mutually exclusive states (here: of health worker effectiveness). Transitions between these health 
states are assigned probabilities and the model's predictions are evaluated over a series of 
cycles (Sonnenberg & Beck, 1993).    12 




In providing ART, health workers reduce mortality among HIV-positive people 
and induce costs (salaries and costs of drugs).  Both HAHW effectiveness and 
costs depend on the type of ART that they provide to their patients.  First-line 
therapy in the first year of treatment is less effective than first- or second-line 
therapy in later years; second-line therapy is more expensive than first-line 
therapy.  To capture these differences, we distinguish between the following 
mutually exclusive HAHW states in our Markov model: first-line ART in the first 
year of treatment (ART1); first-line ART in the second or a later year of treatment 
(ART2); second-line ART (ART3); and an absorbing state (Exit) which HAHW 
enter if they die or leave their assigned posts before completion of the service 
commitment.  The unit of our analyses is a “minimum team” of health workers, 
consisting of nurses, treatment counselors, doctors, and pharmacists.  We define 
a minimum team as the team with the smallest number of members in which 
none of the four categories of HAHW has less than one member.  We fix the ratio 
of nurses to treatment counselors to doctors to pharmacists at 3:10:1:1 based on 
                                       
3 Markov models can be evaluated deterministically by cohort simulation or stochastically by 
Monte Carlo microsimulation.  In cohort simulation, large cohorts of people are sent through the 
model simultaneously.  The initial distribution of people in different Markov states and the 
transition probabilities between the states completely determine how many people are in each 
state after each cycle.  In contrast, in microsimulation individuals are simulated moving between 
states from cycle to cycle one at a time.  The transition probabilities in this case are realized as 
random events, so that different microsimulations with equal numbers of individuals are unlikely 
to yield exactly the same result.  However, if a large number of individuals are simulated in 
microsimulation, the results from different microsimulations will be approximately the same and 
will closely approximate the result of the cohort simulation.   13 
a 2006 review of staffing patterns at ART sites in Africa and Asia (Hirschhorn et 
al., 2006).  In the base case, a minimum team is assumed to be able to provide 
treatment to 500 patients (Hirschhorn et al., 2006).  We assume that in their first 
year of service commitment the minimum team treats only patients who are 
newly initiated on ART.  This assumption closely resembles the situation in many 
developing countries with large unmet ART need (Braitstein, Brinkhof, Dabis, 
Schechter, Boulle, Miotti et al., 2006).  After having completed the first year in 
ART1, the minimum team either leaves the required service prematurely 
(because of emigration or deaths of members) or continues its service.  If the 
team continues its service, it will transition to ART2 if its patients survive, to 
ART1 if its patients die or are lost to follow-up, or to ART3 if its patients need to 
switch from first-line to second-line therapy because of toxicities or treatment 
failure.  Similarly, in any future cycle a minimum team that does not end its 
service prematurely will transition either to ART1, ART2, or ART3, depending on 
whether it continues to see the same patients on first line treatment (ART2), the 
same patients on second-line treatment (ART3) or starts treating new patients 
(ART1).   
 
The cycle length for the model is set to 1 year.  In each cycle, the minimum team 
induces benefits (the monetary value of the life-years saved because of ART) 
and costs depending on its current Markov state.  We adopt a modified societal 
perspective, in that the indirect costs of antiretroviral treatment that accrue to 
patients (time and travel costs) are not included in the analyses.  Further, we do   14 
not take into account reductions in health spending that come about because 
patients on ART fall ill less often and less severely than people who need ART 
but do not receive it.  In the base case, future costs and benefits were discounted 
at 3% per year, as recommended by the US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in 
Health and Medicine (Siegel, Torrance, Russell, Luce, Weinstein, & Gold, 1997) 
and as is commonly done in priority setting for health in developing countries 
(Goldie, Yazdanpanah, Losina, Weinstein, Anglaret, Walensky et al., 2006; C. J. 
Murray & Lopez, 1996).  In sensitivity analyses, we varied the discount rate 
between 2% and 8%.  All costs and benefits were measured in year-2000 US 
dollars.  Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts in the text below are 
expressed in year-2000 US dollars.  The model was implemented in TreeAge Pro 
Suite 2007 (TreeAge Software Inc., Williamstown, MA, USA). 
 
Simulated scenarios 
The two possible effects of the “conditional scholarship” – an increase in health 
care education rates and a decrease in health worker emigration rates – may 
play out differently in different countries.  In some countries, health care 
education capacity is not fully utilized, i.e. additional health workers could be 
trained without additional investment in facilities or hiring of additional teachers. 
In these countries, “conditional scholarships” will lead to an increase in the output 
of trained health workers in the short term, if there is a pool of qualified 
candidates who desire a health care education but do not have access to a 
source of finance of a health care education other than the “conditional   15 
scholarships” because of market failures in formal or informal capital markets.  In 
all countries – independent of their utilization of health care education capacity – 
the “conditional scholarships” could increase HAHW retention if scholarship 
recipients’ emigration rates are on average lower than the migration rates of 
people who do not receive the scholarships.   
 
We thus estimate eNPV of the “conditional scholarships” in different scenarios: 
first, all scholarship recipients are in addition to the HAHW who would have been 
in place in the absence of the scholarship program, and emigration rates among 
scholarship recipients are the same as the rates among health workers who do 
not receive the scholarship; second, all scholarship recipients are in addition to 
the HAHW who would have been in place in the absence of the program, and 
emigration rates among scholarship recipients are lower than the rates among 
other health workers; third, the scholarship program does not increase the 
number of health workers but decreases emigration rates among health workers 
who receive the scholarships.   
 
A new dataset published by the World Bank International Migration and 
Development Program contains doctor emigration rates from 46 sub-Saharan 
African countries for a total of 642 country-years (Docquier & Bhargava, 
2006).  When the number of doctors in each country in each year of observation 
is used as weighting factor and the annual rates are converted to annual 
probabilities, the weighted average annual probability of doctor emigration across   16 
the 642 country-years is 13.4%.  In our model, we use values for the annual 
probability of HAHW emigration in the absence of “conditional scholarships” that 
are slightly higher (15%) or slightly lower (12%) than this weighted average. 
Further, in different scenarios we vary the effect of the “conditional scholarships” 
on annual emigration probabilities as a reduction to either 5% or 3% per year 
during the period of the service commitment.  Finally, we vary the length of the 
service commitment (3, 5, or 7 years) (Table 2). 
  
Estimates for model variables 
Estimates for model variables, as derived from published studies, are shown in 
Table 1.  The baseline costs of the “conditional scholarships” are based on 
estimates of the costs of medical school and nursing school in Malawi in 2006 
(Muula, Panulo, & Maseko, 2006) and the cost of medical school in Kenya in 
2005 (Kirigia, Gbary, Muthuri, Nyoni, & Seddoh, 2006).  The estimates from 
Malawi and Kenya include tuition and the cost of living during the time of health 
care education (Kirigia et al., 2006; Muula et al., 2006).  In univariate sensitivity 
analysis we vary the cost of the “conditional scholarships” up to a maximum 
(725,000 dollars) that would cover tuition and living expenses of a minimum team 
of HAHW, if such a team were educated in the United States (American Medical 
Student Association, 2007; Morrison, 2005). 
 
Other costs included in the model are doctor, nurse, pharmacist, and treatment 
counselor salaries and treatment costs (first- and second-line ART,   17 
cotrimoxazole prophylaxis, CD4 counts).  We use weighted averages of the 
prices of antiretroviral drugs across all sub-Saharan countries for which price 
information was available in the WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism 
(GPRM) in June 2007 (WHO, 2007a).  As weighting factors we use the number 
of people in each sub-Saharan country who according to WHO and UNAIDS 
needed ART in December 2006 but did not receive it (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).  
Information on both drug price and people with unmet ART need was available 
for 35, 34, 32, 29, 23, 21, 19, and 16 sub-Saharan countries for nevirapine 
(NVP), efavirenz (EFV), lamivudine (3TC), stavudine (d4T), abacavir (ABC), 
lopinavir/ritonavir (LPV/r), didanosine (ddI), and tenofovir disoproxil fumarate 
(TDF), respectively.  In the base case, we assume that first-line ART consists of 
d4T, 3TC, and NVP, which are offered as first-line ART in many sub-Saharan 
countries (South African Department of Health, 2004; WHO, 2007b).  We 
calculate weighted average prices for three other first-line regimens (d4T, 3TC 
and EFV; zidovudine (AZT), 3TC and NVP; AZT, 3TC and EFV) and vary the 
price of first-line therapy in univariate sensitivity analysis, using the weighted 
average price of the most expensive of the four first-line ART (AZT, 3TC and 
EFV) as the maximum.  Similarly, we assume in the base case that second-line 
ART in sub-Saharan Africa consists of ddI, 3TC and LPV/r (WHO, 2007b), but 
calculate weighted average prices for three alternative regimens (ddI, ABC and 
LPV/r;  TDF, ABC and LPV/r; TDF, 3TC and LPV/r) to estimate the eNPV of the 
“conditional scholarships” if the least expensive and the most expensive of the 
four regimens are used as second-line ART (Table 3a).     18 
 
Estimates of mortality among people with CD4 count below 200 who do not 
receive ART are taken from a study in South Africa (Badri, Lawn, & Wood, 2006), 
and estimates of mortality among people with CD4 count below 200 at initiation 
of ART in the first and subsequent years of treatment are based on a 2006 
review of 18 ART programs in low-income countries (Braitstein et al., 2006).  
Mortality among patients who are switched from first- to second-line therapy 
because of toxicity or therapy failure are assumed to be the same as those on 
first-line therapy in the second or later years of treatment  (MSF, 2007b). 
 
The dominant benefit of an ART program is the reduction in mortality as a result 
of treatment (Cameron, Gibson, Helmers, Lim, Tressler, & Vaddanak, 2006).  
Only a few estimates of the monetary value of a statistical life year (VSLY) 
(Johansson, 2001, 2002) exist for developing countries and these estimates vary 
widely (Viscusi & Aldy, 2003).  No estimate of the VSLY in Africa has been 
published.  In our baseline estimation, we thus follow the convention suggested 
by the 2001 WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health to value a 
statistical life year at three times the per capita GDP (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001).  This valuation is intended to capture “value 
of leisure time in addition to market consumption, the pure longevity effect, and 
the pain and suffering associated with disease” (World Bank, 2007).   A number 
of recent studies both in developed and developing countries adopt this 
convention (Cutler & Richardson, 1997; C.J. Murray, Lauer, & Hutubessy, 2003;   19 
Philipson & Soares, 2001).  We use the weighted average of per capita GDP 
across sub-Saharan African countries (World Bank, 2007), with the numbers of 
patients who needed but did not receive ART in December 2006 as weighting 
factors (UNAIDS/WHO, 2007).   
 




Table 2 shows the eNPV of “conditional scholarships” for one minimum team of 
HAHW in 26 scenarios.  The scenarios differ with regard to, first, whether the 
scholarships affect education output, migration, or both; second, the level of 
migration with and without scholarships; and third, the length of the service 
commitment.  Using 10,000 microsimulation trials, all 26 scenarios yield large 
positive eNPV estimates for “conditional scholarships” for one minimum HAHW 
team.  The eNPV of all scenarios in which the “conditional scholarships” increase 
education output of HAHW and decrease emigration (1.12 to 1.61 million dollars) 
is significantly higher than the eNPV of the scenarios in which the scholarships 
only increase education output (0.80 and 0.95 million dollars).  In turn, the eNPV 
of the two scenarios in which the scholarships only affect education output is 
significantly higher than the eNPV of any of the scenarios in which the 
“conditional scholarships” only reduce HAHW emigration probabilities (0.15 and 
0.56 million dollars).  As must necessarily be the case in valid models, ceteris   20 
paribus all scenarios with shorter service commitments have lower eNPV than 
scenarios with longer commitments, and all scenarios with a larger reduction in 
emigration probabilities due to the scholarships have higher eNPV than 
scenarios with smaller reductions.   
 
< Table 2 about here > 
  
Sensitivity analysis 
Figure 3 shows how eNPV varies with changes in selected variables from the 
base case (i.e. when it is assumed that the “conditional scholarships” increase 
education output and decrease the annual probability of emigration from 15% to 
5% during a five-year service commitment, and all variables are set to their base-
case values as shown in Table 1).  The selected variables cause the largest 
changes in eNPV amongst all variables in the model, when each individual 
variable is varied between the minimum and maximum values shown in Table 1.  
The results were most strongly affected by variations in the number of patients 
treated by one minimum HAHW team, the value of a statistical life year and the 
costs of first-line ART.  However, when individual variables are varied within 
plausible bounds suggested by the literature (see Table 1) (Bertozzi, Gutierrez, 
Opuni, Walker, & Schwartlander, 2004; Calmy, Pinoges, Szumilin, Zachariah, 
Ford, & Ferradini, 2006; Coetzee, Hildebrand, Boulle, Maartens, Louis, Labatala 
et al., 2004; Dovlo, 2007; Etard, Ndiaye, Thierry-Mieg, Gueye, Gueye, Laniece et 
al., 2006; Ferradini, Jeannin, Pinoges, Izopet, Odhiambo, Mankhambo et al.,   21 
2006; Gutierrez, Johns, Adam, Bertozzi, Edejer, Greener et al., 2004; Lawn, 
Myer, Bekker, & Wood, 2006; MSF, 2004, 2006, 2007b; C.J. Murray et al., 2003; 
Padarath, Chamberlain, McCoy, Ntuli, Rowson, & Loewenson, 2003; Philipson & 
Soares, 2001; Sambo, 2006; Yazdanpanah, Losina, Anglaret, Goldie, Walensky, 
Weinstein et al., 2005), eNPV never falls below 0.48 million dollars.  The VSLY 
would need to be less than 1400 dollars in order for eNPV to be negative, when 
all other variables are set to their base-case values. 
 
< Figure 3 about here > 
 
Discussion 
Value of “conditional scholarships” 
“Conditional scholarships” pay for a health care education in return for a 
commitment to serve for a few years in an ART program in sub-Saharan Africa.  
They are socially highly desirable investments under a range of plausible 
assumptions about the cost of health care education, the efficiency of health 
workers providing ART, the cost and effectiveness of ART, and the value of a 
year of life, as well as the probabilities of emigration and death among health 
workers and of treatment failure, loss to follow-up, and death among patients.  
The values of some of the variables used in the model may change over time, for 
instance, as new models of ART delivery are developed or new antiretroviral 
medicines with different efficacies and costs become available.  However, our 
main finding – that “conditional scholarships” would have large social benefits in   22 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa – is quite robust to changes in key model 
variables.  It seems unlikely that this conclusion would be altered by reasonable 
changes in the values of some variables.  One extreme – and given current 
knowledge unexpected (amfAR, 2007) – case of technological change would be 
a cure for HIV infection.  A cure would dramatically alter the eNPV of the 
“conditional scholarships” as it would eliminate the need for ART. But it is unlikely 
that a “conditional scholarship” program would lead to large financial losses for a 
country because the program could stop accepting new entrants and existing 
scholarship recipients could be deployed to administer the HIV cure or work as 
part of the general health service.   
 
Although either of the two possible effects of the “conditional scholarships” (an 
increase in health care education output and a decrease in emigration of HAHW) 
is sufficient on its own to make the scholarship a socially desirable investment, 
the social value of the education effect is much higher than the value of the 
migration effect.  However, in countries where health care education capacity is 
currently fully utilized, the “conditional scholarships” will not affect national health 
education output in the short-term and can only increase the number of HAHW 
by increasing retention rates.  Nevertheless, they may increase the demand for 
health care education. Where some “conditional scholarships” cannot be taken 
up because the current education capacity is too low,  they will still give some 
people who were previously willing but not able to pay for health education the 
ability to pay for it.  In countries with substantial private health care education   23 
markets, the increase in demand should lead to an increase in education supply 
via the price mechanism.  In countries that currently do not have private 
education markets, governments could decide to increase public sector health 
care education capacity.  Alternatively, governments in such countries could pass 
legislation legalizing private health care education institutions, while limiting their 
own role to accreditation and quality control (Cueto, Burch, Adnan, Afolabi, 
Ismail, Jafri et al., 2006; WHO and World Federation for Medical Education 
(WFME) Task Force on Accreditation, 2004).  In many developing countries, for 
instance in India (Bansai, 2003), the Philippines, Nigeria (Cueto et al., 2006), 
Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Congo (Verspoor, Mattimir, & Watt, 2001), South 
Africa (South African Nursing Council, 2006), and Angola (De Carvalho, 
Kajibanga, & Heimer, 2007), private sector medical and nursing education 
institutions already produce a large proportion of the national health worker 
output, usually of quality en par with public sector institutions.   
 
A constraint to the expansion of health care education capacity may be the lack 
of health educators (WHO, 2006).  This problem may be made worse by the HIV 
epidemic.  At least in the early phases of the epidemic, teachers and professors 
were more likely to die of AIDS than the general population (Cohen, 2002).  One 
solution to this problem may be to organize extended stays of volunteer health 
workers from developed countries, including retired doctors and nurses, to teach 
in developing country education institutions.  Charities that organize such 
volunteer stays to teach and train health workers in developing countries already   24 
exist, for instance US Physicians for Africa ("US doctors for Africa: about us," 
2007) and the International Center for Equal Healthcare Access ("International 
Center for Healthcare Access: about us," 2007).  Other means of overcoming 
shortages of health care teachers include distance education and twinning 
arrangements between institutions in developing and developed countries (Hern, 
Vaughn, Mason, & Weitkamp, 2005; The Tropical Health and Education Trust, 
2007).  
 
An alternative to expanding education capacity in sub-Saharan African countries 
is to utilize education capacity in developed countries.  “Conditional scholarships” 
could be offered to African nationals – or to any student independent of his or her 
nationality – who would be willing to commit to work in an ART program in sub-
Saharan Africa after completion of a health care education in a developed 
country.  We show that the social value of “conditional scholarships” is still highly 
positive if the value of the scholarships is increased to levels that could finance a 
health care education in the United States.  
 
Value of a statistical life year 
In order to measure the eNPV of a health care intervention that reduces 
mortality, a monetary value must be assigned to a year of life.  We follow the 
suggestion of the 2001 WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health to 
value a life year at three times the per capita GDP (Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001).  However, this value was not derived from   25 
scientific studies, but arrived at through a consensus process amongst members 
of the Commission.  VSLY can be investigated in two types of studies.  In 
contingent valuation studies, respondents are asked how much they would be 
willing to pay for an additional year of life.  Monetary values for a year of life can 
also be derived from preferences revealed in the market place via studies of 
prices of interventions that reduce mortality risk or differences in wage levels 
across jobs that are comparable except for the fact that they carry different 
mortality risks.  No study of the VSLY in Africa has been published.  However, a 
few estimates of VSLY exist for other developing countries (Viscusi & Aldy, 
2003).  Following Moore and Viscusi (1988) (Moore & Viscusi, 1988), we derive 
VSLY from the value of a statistical life (VSL) given in three studies of VSL in 
developing countries.
4  For India in 1990 we thus derive VSLY of 69,000 and 
96,000 dollars from two VSL estimates published in a study of revealed 
preferences observed in the Indian labor market (Shanmugam, 2000).  For 
Thailand in 2003 and Cambodia in 2004 we derive, respectively, VSLY of 10,000 
and 20,000 dollars from studies of stated preferences (Cameron et al., 2006; 
Gibson, Barns, Cameron, Lim, Scrimgeour, & Tressler, 2007).  These values 
represent multiples of per capita GDP which are higher than our base case 
assumption of 3 times per capita GDP – 220 and 306 times per capita GDP for 
India in 1990; 4.5 times per capita GDP for Thailand in 2003; and 55 times per 
capita GDP for Cambodia in 2004 (World Bank, 2007).   
                                       
4 We use a discount rate of 3% and the life expectancy in the year of the study in the country of 
the study (India in 1990, Thailand in 2003, and Cambodia in 2004) and assume that the average 
respondent in the study was 30 years of age.     26 
 
As Viscusi and Aldy note in a review of VSL estimates throughout the world, 
“[e]stimates for the Indian labor market yield a value of a statistical life greater 
than the VSLs in other developing countries despite the fact that per capita 
income in India is an order of magnitude smaller than in these countries” (Viscusi 
& Aldy, 2003).  While the high VSLY-to-GDP ratios estimated for India may thus 
not be generalizable to other developing countries, even the substantially lower 
ratios observed in Cambodia and Thailand suggest that we underestimate – 
perhaps severely – the monetary benefit from the “conditional scholarships” by 
valuing a statistical life year at three times GDP. 
 
Implementation decisions 
Obtaining repayment of education finance through labor in sectors with excess 
social demand for labor is not a new idea.  For instance, Ethiopia, South Africa, 
and Thailand (Wibulpolprasert & Pengpaibon, 2003) require medical students to 
perform community service in rural areas after graduating from publicly funded 
medical schools.  However, in all three countries there continue to be health 
worker shortages in rural areas.  In Ghana, doctors are “bonded” to serve for five 
years in the public sector or to repay their training costs.  However, because the 
monetary value of the bond is defined in nominal terms and inflation is high in 
Ghana, many doctors choose to repay their training costs (at a large financial 
loss to the government) rather than serve in the public sector.  Moreover, 
because enforcement of the bonding policy is poor, some doctors emigrate   27 
without either completing the required public service or paying their bond 
(Mensah, 2005).   
 
As the example of Ghana suggests, the attributes chosen for the scholarships 
will determine their effectiveness in increasing the national health workforce for 
ART.  Attributes of the “conditional scholarships” include the source of finance, 
selection of candidates, specification of the conditional term, enforcement 
mechanisms, and supporting interventions.  
  
1. Sources of finance 
Finance for the “conditional scholarships” could come from tax revenues, 
international aid agencies, or the International Finance Facility (IFF).  Because 
the scholarships have a positive social eNPV, in the absence of other sources of 
finance governments should always choose to finance them from the public 
sector budget, if funds are available even after projects with higher eNPV have 
been chosen.  However, governments of developing countries may face 
borrowing constraints or may not be able to allocate monies to the “conditional 
scholarships” for political reasons.  An alternative is to finance the scholarships 
through aid from international agencies.  However, aid agencies tend to finance 
projects for periods that may not be sufficiently long to create a sustainable 
“conditional scholarships” program and they may be reluctant to provide “running 
cost” support for training health workers.  The latter problem is highlighted by 
recent discussions about whether large disease-specific aid agencies, e.g.,   28 
PEPFAR, the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the GAVI 
Alliance, should invest in human resources for health in developing countries 
(GAVI, 2003; JLI, 2004b; Ooms et al., 2007; The Global Fund, 2007). 
 
Another funding option would be through the IFF as proposed by the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) (DFID and HM Treasury, 
2003).  An IFF would leverage development aid by issuing bonds on international 
capital markets against long-term commitments of annual payments from 
developed countries to developing countries.  A project financed by the IFF 
would need to pass two economic tests (DFID and HM Treasury, 2004).  First, its 
rate of return must be higher than the cost of borrowing needed to raise funds for 
the project.  Second, the rate of return must be greater than the recipient 
country’s target rate of return for public investment.  It is likely that the project 
would pass both tests.  On the one hand, the cost of borrowing would be very low 
because the financial pledges would come from countries with the highest 
creditworthiness ratings.  On the other hand, we find that the eNPV of the 
“conditional scholarships” remains positive if the discount rate in our model is 
increased to 8%, i.e., the internal rate of return of the “conditional scholarship” is 
higher than the commonly used target rate of return of 8% for public investment 
in developing countries (DFID and HM Treasury, 2004). 
 
 
   29 
2. Selection of candidates 
The optimal selection of candidates for the scholarships will depend on whether 
policy makers want to achieve additional objectives with the intervention.  
Financial equity in access to tertiary education could be improved if eligibility for 
the scholarships were based on a means test.  Merit could be rewarded if 
eligibility were based on secondary school performance.  The proportion of 
health care students from traditionally underrepresented population groups (e.g., 
women or people from rural areas) could be increased if these groups received a 
proportion of the scholarships higher than their proportion in the population.    
 
The selection of candidates may also influence the effectiveness of the 
scholarships.  For instance, there is evidence from both developing and 
developed countries that medical students from rural areas are more likely than 
their peers from urban areas to take up practice in rural areas after graduation 
(Daniels, Vanleit, Skipper, Sanders, & Rhyne, 2007; World Organization of 
Family Doctors (WONCA) Working Party on Rural Practice, 2002).  For instance, 
a 2003 study from South Africa found that ten years after graduating from 
medical school doctors of rural origin were 3.5 times more likely than doctors of 
urban origin to practice in rural areas (de Vries & Reid, 2003).  People who grew 
up in rural areas may be more likely than urban candidates to honor their 
“conditional scholarship” contracts and to remain at the station of their service 
commitments after completion of their contracts in rural ART programs, possibly   30 
because they feel a greater sense duty to help rural patients or because they 
prefer rural life-styles. 
 
One possible problem with the “conditional scholarships” is that it takes time to 
train health workers, while human resources to deliver ART are needed now.  
The “conditional scholarship” policy may address this problem if scholarships are 
made available to people at any stage of their training and health care careers.  
The scholarships could be attractive to people who are already fully qualified 
health workers as an option for repaying education loans.  A case in point is the 
U.S. National Institute of Health loan repayment program which requires medical 
graduates to work for some years in research rather than in (better paying) 
practice (Ley & Rosenberg, 2005).  It is likely that such a model could be 
successful in those developing countries where health education graduates have 
usually incurred substantial amounts of debt.  For instance, it has been estimated 
that in Colombia it takes a non-specialist doctor on average 4 years and a 
physiotherapist on average 10 years to pay back health care education loans 
(JLI, 2004a).   
 
3. Specification of the condition 
Our eNPV model rests on the assumption that scholarship recipients work in 
ART programs after graduation.  This exclusive condition might be perceived as 
institutionalizing a priority for AIDS treatment over other health care.  However, 
the finding that the “conditional scholarships” are eNPV-positive is robust to   31 
changes in the assumption that scholarship recipients spend all of their work time 
in ART programs.  Microsimulation suggests that even if scholarship recipients 
spend only a proportion of their work time delivering ART, eNPV will remain 
highly positive.  For instance, we find an eNPV of 0.45 million dollars for 
scholarships for a minimum team of HAHW assuming that scholarship recipients 
work only half-time in an ART program, that the probability of emigration is 5% 
during a 5 year service commitment and 15% otherwise, and that the 
scholarships increase education output.  Rather than not implement a 
“conditional scholarship” program, countries should ask recipients of “conditional 
scholarships” to commit to part-time work in an ART program. 
 
In addition, our estimates of the numbers of different types of health workers 
needed to provide ART to one patient come from real-life ART programs.  In 
these programs, HIV-positive patients commonly receive not only ART but also 
treatment for other HIV-related diseases, especially tuberculosis, and care for 
conditions that are not related to HIV.  Although we estimate the “conditional 
scholarship” project’s economic value with benefits stemming from ART delivery 
alone, its costs include care for HIV-positive patients over and above ART. The 
work of scholarship recipients in an ART program thus frees up time of health 
workers in other health services, where HIV-positive patients without access to 
an ART program would present with their illnesses.  Moreover, people who need 
ART but do not receive it fall ill more frequently and more severely than patients 
on ART.  In countries with generalized epidemics, large proportions of in- and   32 
outpatient admissions in the general health services are related to HIV (Bardgett, 
Dixon, & Beeching, 2006; Dedicoat, Grimwade, Newton, & Gilks, 2003; Floyd, 
Reid, Wilkinson, & Gilks, 1999).  Thus, a scholarship condition requiring work in 
ART services will likely strengthen the overall health care system, especially in 
countries with high HIV prevalence.  
 
In addition to requiring service in ART delivery, the condition may specify the 
setting of the service.  The effectiveness of the scholarships in addressing health 
care worker shortages may be increased if this setting is defined by a 
characteristic that increases the probability that the area is underserved (as in 
rural areas).  They may be most effective if the setting is not defined ex ante, but 
rather if scholarship recipients are asked to commit to serve in an ART program 
in any setting that policy makers identify as being most in need of additional 
HAHW at the time of the worker’s service. 
 
Finally, the condition may specify alternatives to the service commitment, for 
instance, a certain payment.  Payment as an alternative to service has the 
advantage that it renders the condition less restrictive, and may thus increase the 
attractiveness of the “conditional scholarships” to candidates.  However, without 
prior experience it may be difficult for governments to set the appropriate price, 
such that it is neither too high to be paid back by any candidate (which would 
make the payment option meaningless), nor so low as to be easily paid back by 
most recipients immediately after graduation (which would make the “conditional   33 
scholarship” meaningless).  Price setting will be especially difficult in countries 
with high inflation, because policy makers in such countries will either need to 
accurately predict the real future values of a current nominal price or link the 
value of the payment to inflation.  
 
4. Enforcement mechanisms 
Enforcement mechanisms will depend on legal, institutional, and technological 
factors specific to a country.  Regulation, such as withholding diplomas or 
licenses from scholarship recipients until they have completed their community 
service, may decrease the risk that scholarship recipients breach their contracts 
(Table 2a).  Other enforcement mechanisms, such as visa restrictions on health 
workers before completion of their required service times or employment of 
private monitoring agencies to check that graduates fulfill their conditions as 
stipulated (for instance, that they do not work in private practice), may be 
effective in enforcing the condition, but may come with the disadvantage of 
limiting basic freedoms or impinging on the privacy of health workers. Information 
management systems may help to plan and monitor the flow of scholarship 
recipients through the education system and into their assigned posts.   
 
5. Supporting interventions 
Other interventions to increase the number of health workers in a country (or to 
improve their distribution) could be implemented simultaneously with the 
“conditional scholarships” in order to increase the effectiveness of the   34 
scholarships.  For instance incentives that increase the attractiveness of service 
in the country (or underserved parts of the country) may, in addition to promoting 
an increase in health workers more generally, increase retention rates after 
health workers have completed their service commitment.  Such incentives might 
include improved working conditions, more attractive career paths, or free ART 
for health workers and their families (Table 4).  Focusing health education 
curricula on the health care needs that scholarship recipients are most likely to 
encounter when delivering ART (such as opportunistic infections, HIV-related 
cancers, or ART toxicities) may increase the effectiveness of scholarship 
recipients’ clinical services.   
 
Conclusions 
In spite of recent large-scale efforts to roll out ART in developing countries, 
millions of people who need ART currently do not receive it.   Among the 
resources needed to deliver ART in developing countries, health workers are one 
of the scarcest.  Without large increases in health workers in the coming years, 
most developing countries will be unable to achieve universal coverage with 
ART, leading to large numbers of potentially avoidable deaths.  A scholarship for 
health care education that is conditional on the recipient entering into a contract 
to work for a number of years after graduation delivering ART in sub-Saharan 
Africa could address two of the main reasons for the low numbers of health 
workers in developing countries.  First, the “scholarship” could increase the 
number of health workers educated in the country.  Second, the “condition” could   35 
decrease the probability of emigration of HAHW.  We use microsimulation to 
estimate the eNPV of “conditional scholarships” in sub-Saharan Africa.  We find 
that under a wide range of plausible assumptions the scholarships are highly 
eNPV positive.  “Conditional scholarships” for a team of health workers sufficient 
to provide ART for 500 patients have an eNPV of 1.23 million dollars, assuming 
that HAHW who receive the scholarships are in addition to the health workers 
who would have been educated without scholarships and that the scholarships 
reduce HAHW annual emigration probabilities from 15% to 5% for five years.  
When individual variable values are varied from this base case within plausible 
bounds suggested by the literature, eNPV of the “conditional scholarships” never 
falls below 0.5 million dollars.   Although the “conditional scholarships” are a 
socially desirable investment, implementation success will likely depend on the 
sources of finance, selection of candidates, specification of the condition, 
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of selected model variables 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Mean annual probability of first-line ART failure      
(0.025 to 0.041)
Treatment costs per patient-year, second-line ART
($642 to $1,232)
Salaries per year per HAHW mininum team          
($56,000 to $14,000)
Discount rate                                                        
(0.08 to 0.02)
Mean annual probability of death without ART      
(0.218 to 0.256)
Cost of 'conditional scholarships' per HAHW minimum
team ($725,000 to $124,000)
Treatment costs per patient-year, first-line ART    
($355 to $100)
Value of a statistical life year                                  
($2,056 to $4,111)
Number of patients treated by minimum team        
(333 to 1,000)
Expected net present value of "conditional scholarships" for one minimum team of HIV/AIDS 
health workers (in million year-2000 US dollars ($))  50 
Tables 
Table 1: Values of model variables 
 
  Base-case Minimum  Maximum  Reference 
Value of a statistical life year (year-2000 US dollars)  3,084  2,056  4,111  (Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health, 2001) 
       
HAHW minimum team       
Ratio nurses:treatment counselors:doctors:pharmacists  3:10:1:1      (Hirschhorn et al., 2006) 
Number of patients treated by minimum team  500  333  1,000  (Hirschhorn et al., 2006) 
       
Education costs = value of “conditional scholarship” 
(year 2000 $) 
     
Doctors  42,000  32,000   200,000   (Muula et al., 2006) 
Nurses  24,000  19,000   95,000   (Kirigia et al., 2006; Muula et al., 2006) 
Pharmacists  35,000  25,000   140,000    
Treatment counselors  3,000  1,000   10,000    
HAHW minimum team  179,000  124,000   725,000    
       
Salaries per year (year-2000 US dollars)       
Doctors  7,000  3,000   15,000   (Vujicic, Zurn, Diallo, Adams, & Dal Poz, 
2004) 
Nurses  2,000  1,000   7,000   (Vujicic et al., 2004) 
Pharmacists  5,000  3,000   10,000    
Treatment counselors  700  500  1,000   (Foundation for hospices in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2007) 
HAHW minimum team  25,000  14,000  56,000   
       
Patient probabilities       
Mean annual probability of death without ART  0.237  0.218  0.256  (Badri et al., 2006) 
Mean annual probability of death in first year of treatment, 
first-line ART 
0.064  0.057  0.071  (Braitstein et al., 2006) 
Mean annual probability of death in second or later year of 
treatment, first-line ART 
0.027  0.022  0.032  (Braitstein et al., 2006)   51 
Mean annual probability of death in second or later year of 
treatment, second-line ART 
0.027  0.022 0.032  
Mean annual probability of loss to follow-up  0.100  0.024  0.156  (Marazzi, Guidotti, Liotta, & Palombi, 2005; 
Nacher, El Guedj, Vaz, Nasser, 
Randrianjohany, Alvarez et al., 2006) 
Mean annual probability of first-line treatment failure  0.033  0.025 0.041 (Orrell,  Harling, Lawn, Kaplan, McNally, 
Bekker et al., 2007) 
       
HAHW minimum team probabilities       
Mean annual probability of emigration  See table 2      (Docquier & Bhargava, 2006) 
Minimum team, age-specific probability of death  Age and sex-
specific 
  (INDEPTH  Network,  2004) 
       
Treatment costs per patient-year (year-2000 US 
dollars)       
First-line ART  120  100  355  (South African Department of Health, 2004; 
WHO, 2007a, b) 
Second-line ART  698  641  1,232 
(South African Department of Health, 2004; 
WHO, 2007a, b) 
CD counts  8  5  20  (Carter, 2004; ReaMetrix, 2007) 
Cotrimoxazole  prophylaxis  3  2 4 (WHO,  2007a) 
       
Discount rate  0.03  0.02 0.08    
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Table 2: Expected net present value of “conditional scholarships” for one minimum team of HIV/AIDS health 
workers 
 
      Mean  95% CI    Mean  95% CI    Mean  95% CI 
Increased education output only             
     15% mean annual probability of emigration  799,067  (781,688 - 
816,446) 
         
     12% mean annual probability of emigration  954,097  (934,586 - 
973,607) 
         
             
Length of service commitment  3 years      5 years    7 years 
Increased education output and decreased 
emigration 
           
5% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 15% otherwise 
1,119,711 (1,102,096  -
1,137,325) 
 1,238,763 (1,220,025  -
1,257,501) 
 1,354,293 (1,334,562  -
1,374,024) 
5% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 12% otherwise 
1,284,889 (1,264,631  -
1,305,147) 
 1,349,004 (1,328,526  -
1,369,482) 
  1,417,743   (1,396,472 -
1,439,015) 
3% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 15% otherwise 
1,223,939   (1,206,584 -
1,241,295) 
 1,385,393 (1,366,789  -
1,403,997) 
  1,507,784   (1,488,342 -
1,527,226) 
3% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 12% otherwise 
1,343,552 (1,324,126  -
1,362,978) 
 1,476,995 (1,456,459  -
1,497,532) 
 1,607,055 (1,585,487  -
1,628,623) 
Decreased emigration only             
5% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 15% otherwise 
168,209 (143,923  - 
192,496) 
 287,261  (262,350  - 
312,172) 
 402,792  (377,232  - 
428,351) 
5% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 12% otherwise 
148,670 (120,755  - 
176,585) 
 212,785  (184,481  - 
241,088) 
  281,524   (252,956 - 
310,093) 
3% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 15% otherwise 
272,438 (248,674  - 
296,202) 
 433,891  (408,920  - 
458,863) 











3% mean annual probability of emigration during 
the service requirement; 12% otherwise 
207,333 (179,934  - 
234,731) 
  340,776   (312,364 - 
369,188) 
 470,836  (441,869  - 
499,803)   53 
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Algeria              2,300   25%             1,725               2               3                3            12               2               5 
Angola           66,000   10%          59,604            60          119           119          417            60          179 
Argentina           42,000   79%             8,780               9            18             18            61               9            26 
Azerbaijan                 590   <1%                590               1               1                1               4               1               2 
Bangladesh              1,700   <3%             1,700               2               3                3            12               2               5 
Barbados                 710   87%                  94               0               0                0               1               0               0 
Belarus              2,400   20%             1,926               2               4                4            13               2               6 
Belize                 680   59%                280               0               1                1               2               0               1 
Benin           20,000   38%          12,379            12            25             25            87            12            37 
Bolivia              1,100   24%                837               1               2                2               6               1               3 
Botswana           84,000   >95%             4,200               4               8                8            29               4            13 
Brazil         210,000   85%          30,880            31            62             62          216            31            93 
Burkina Faso           33,000   39%          19,985            20            40             40          140            20            60 
Burundi           31,000   26%          22,805            23            46             46          160            23            68 
Cameroon         110,000   25%          82,057            82          164           164          574            82          246 
Central African 
Republic 
         49,000   6%          46,016            46            92             92          322            46          138 
Chad           36,000   14%          31,035            31            62             62          217            31            93 
Chile              8,900   83%             1,524               2               3                3            11               2               5 
China         110,000   27%          79,849            80          160           160          559            80          240 
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Congo           23,000   17%          19,059            19            38             38          133            19            57 
Costa Rica              1,900   >95%                  95               0               0                0               1               0               0 
Côte d'Ivoire         110,000   28%          79,078            79          158           158          554            79          237 




       200,000   10%        179,041          179          358           358       1,253          179          537 
Djibouti              3,100   19%             2,496               2               5                5            17               2               7 
Dominican 
Republic 
         14,000   37%             8,822               9            18             18            62               9            26 
Ecuador              5,200   34%             3,438               3               7                7            24               3            10 
Egypt                 910   22%                709               1               1                1               5               1               2 
El Salvador              8,500   39%             5,156               5            10             10            36               5            15 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
            1,800   24%             1,377               1               3                3            10               1               4 
Eritrea           12,000   8%          11,002            11            22             22            77            11            33 
Gabon           12,000   35%             7,751               8            16             16            54               8            23 
Gambia              3,500   12%             3,072               3               6                6            22               3               9 
Georgia                 700   32%                476               0               1                1               3               0               1 
Ghana           63,000   16%          53,123            53          106           106          372            53          159 
Guatemala           12,000   52%             5,725               6            11             11            40               6            17 
Guinea           17,000   10%          15,225            15            30             30          107            15            46 
Guinea- 
Bissau 
            6,300   6%             5,932               6            12             12            42               6            18 
Guyana              2,500   72%                712               1               1                1               5               1               2 
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Honduras           11,000   40%             6,646               7            13             13            47               7            20 
Indonesia           25,000   20%          19,912            20            40             40          139            20            60 
Iran, Islamic 
Republic of  
            8,400   5%             7,973               8            16             16            56               8            24 
Jamaica              4,500   56%             1,996               2               4                4            14               2               6 
Kazakhstan              3,700   10%             3,320               3               7                7            23               3            10 
Kenya         290,000   44%        162,400          162          325           325       1,137          162          487 
Lesotho           57,000   31%          39,373            39            79             79          276            39          118 
Madagascar              8,100   1%             8,008               8            16             16            56               8            24 
Malawi         190,000   43%        108,126          108          216           216          757          108          324 
Malaysia           12,000   22%             9,375               9            19             19            66               9            28 
Mali           27,000   37%          17,135            17            34             34          120            17            51 
Mauritania              2,400   17%             1,997               2               4                4            14               2               6 
Mexico           46,000   76%          11,065            11            22             22            77            11            33 
Morocco              3,400  41%             2,004               2               4                4            14               2               6 
Mozambique         280,000   14%        240,604          241          481           481       1,684          241          722 
Myanmar           76,000   7%          70,736            71          141           141          495            71          212 
Namibia           45,000   71%          12,875            13            26             26            90            13            39 
Nepal           13,000   4%          12,464            12            25             25            87            12            37 
Nicaragua                 940   35%                607               1               1                1               4               1               2 
Niger           16,000   6%          15,118            15            30             30          106            15            45 
Nigeria         550,000   15%        469,994          470          940           940       3,290          470       1,410 
Pakistan           12,000   <1%          12,000            12            24             24            84            12            36 
Panama              4,200   70%             1,250               1               3                3               9               1               4 
Papua New 
Guinea 
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Paraguay              1,800   64%                642               1               1                1               4               1               2 
Peru           18,000   50%             9,000               9            18             18            63               9            27 
Philippines              1,900   10%             1,719               2               3                3            12               2               5 
Russian 
Federation 
       140,000   11%        124,600          125          249           249          872          125          374 
Rwanda           48,000   72%          13,525            14            27             27            95            14            41 
Senegal           12,000   34%             7,924               8            16             16            55               8            24 
Sierra Leone              9,400   14%             8,129               8            16             16            57               8            24 
Somalia              8,800   <1%             8,712               9            17             17            61               9            26 
South Africa      1,000,000   32%        675,196          675       1,350        1,350       4,726          675       2,026 
Sri Lanka                 710   <8%                675               1               1                1               5               1               2 
Sudan           66,000   1%          65,255            65          131           131          457            65          196 
Suriname                 740   93%                  55               0               0                0               0               0               0 
Swaziland           44,000   42%          25,565            26            51             51          179            26            77 
Tajikistan                 500   <5%                500               1               1                1               4               1               2 
Thailand         130,000   88%          15,600            16            31             31          109            16            47 
Togo           23,000   24%          17,434            17            35             35          122            17            52 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
            5,700   45%             3,126               3               6                6            22               3               9 




       280,000   18%        228,981          229          458           458       1,603          229          687 















but did not 
receive it 
Number of doctors 




Number of nurses 






to achieve universal 
ART coverage
e 















        23,000   71%             6,616               7            13             13            46               7            20 
Viet Nam           42,000   17%          34,693            35            69             69          243            35          104 
Zambia         230,000   35%        148,950          149          298           298       1,043          149          447 
Zimbabwe         350,000   15%        298,463          298          597           597       2,089          298          895 
Total      5,731,080         3,916,916       3,917       7,834        7,834    27,418       3,917    11,751 
aestimate as of December 2006 (based on UNAIDS/WHO 2007) 
bestimates as of December 2006, ART coverage assumed 0% if coverage given as <1% or <5%, ART coverage assumed 5% if given as <8%, 
ART coverage assumed 95% if given as >95% (based on UNAIDS/WHO 2007) 
cassuming 1 (low estimate) or 2 (high estimate) doctors needed to provide ART to 1,000 patients 
dassuming 2 (low estimate) or 7 (high estimate) nurses needed to provide ART to 1,000 patients 
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Table 2a: Interventions to increase health worker densities 





Incentives   
Financial   
1 Increase  salaries  + 
2  Permit health workers in the public sector to do some private practice  + 
3  Provide more benefits (pay for education for children, housing, meals, health insurance, pension insurance)  + 
4  Provide financial incentives for health care workers who return to their country of origin   
5  Demand compensation from departing workers  + 
6  Tax income of health workers who leave the country  + 
  Non-financial   
7  Increase opportunities for further education and training in the country  + 
8  Institute attractive career paths  + 
9 Decrease  workload  + 
10  Improve working conditions (workplace safety, supply of medicines and equipment, management information 
systems) 
+ 
11  Increase health care capital inputs (facilities, laboratory equipment, imaging technologies, surgical technologies)  + 
12  Improve human resources management (recruitment, promotion, transfer, discipline, grievances, termination)  + 
13  Offer psychological support for health workers  + 
14  Provide free ART for health workers  + 
Regulation   
15  Delay departure through compulsory service   
16  Introduce “ethical” recruitment policies in recipient countries  + 
17  Implement inter-country non-migration policies  + 
18  Withhold diplomas from health care workers until have served a period of time in the country  + 
19  Make it easier for foreign health workers to obtain visas and work permits     59 
20  Make it easier for foreign health workers to obtain health care licenses   
Education   
21  Provide scholarships for health care studies   
22  Provide loans for health care studies   
23  Implement marketing campaign for health care careers in schools  + 
24  Increase number of secondary education graduates per year  + 
25  Hire health care teachers from other countries  + 
26  Increase training of health care teachers  + 
27  Build health education facilities  + 
Inventions   
Technological   
28  Train health workers who are not internationally mobile   
29  Focus training curricula on local health needs   
Programmatic   
30  Rotate individual health care workers from developed to developing countries   
31  Introduce hospital partnerships with rotations of teams of health care workers   
32  Re-employ retired health care workers from the country   
33  Hire retired health care workers from other countries   
34  Transfer programmatic responsibilities to health care relief organizations   
35  Institute recruitment intermediaries between developed and developing countries   
   
INTERVENTIONS TO DECREASE HEALTH WORKER NEED IN A COUNTRY   
Inventions   
Technological   
36  Use telemedicine to provide specialist medicine where there are no specialists   
37  Standardize treatment for common disease, so that it can be provided by less educated health workers   
38  Provide technological aid to enable less educated health workers to provide diagnosis and treatment   
39  Provide patient training to improve performance of self-diagnosis to decrease the number of unnecessary 
provider-patient contacts 
 
40  Invest in prevention interventions     60 
   
INTERVENTIONS TO IMPROVE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH WORKERS IN A COUNTRY   
Incentives   
Financial   
41  1-3 in underserved areas, but not in well-served areas  + 
42  Introduce education loan payback programs in underserved areas   
Non-financial   
43  7-14 in underserved areas, but not in well-served areas  + 
Regulation   
44  Make service in underserved areas a requirement for admittance to specialist training   
Education   
45  Increase recruitment of students from underserved areas into health care education programs  + 
46  Build education facilities in underserved areas  + 
47  Rotate students through underserved areas during their education and training  + 
Interventions   
Technological   
48  Train health workers who can only find jobs in underserved areas (e.g. community health workers)   
49  Focus training curricula on health needs in underserved areas  + 
Programmatic   
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Table 3a: Weighted average costs of first- and second-line ART across sub-Saharan African countries 
 
  Year-2007 dollars  Year-2000 US dollars 
First-line ART       
d4T, 3TC and NVP  145  120  
AZT, 3TC and NVP  223  185  
d4T, 3TC and EFV  326  270  
AZT, 3TC and EFV  404  335  
Second-line ART    
ddI, 3TC and LPV/r  843  698  
ddI, ABC and LPV/r  1,488  1,232  
TDF, ABC and LPV/r  1,419  1,175  
TDF, 3TC and LPV/r  774  641  
CD4 counts  50  41  
Cotrimoxazole 4  3   
ART = antiretroviral treatment.  d4T = stavudine; 3TC = lamivudine; NVP = nevirapine; 
AZT = zidovudine; EFV = efavirenz; ddI = didanosine; LPV/r = lopinavir/ritonavir; ABC = 
abacavir; TDF = Tenofovir disoproxil fumarate.   We used the number of people with 
unmet ART need as the weighting factor in the calculation of the weighted average. 
 